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A B S T R AC T | The first erosion of democracy in Latin America did not occur in the twentieth-century, but, rather, 
the nineteenth. I will argue that in Mexico and Colombia a vibrant, democratic political culture had emerged by the 
1850s; however, by the 1870s, a political movement that united Liberals and Conservatives began to suspect that 
the democratic politics they had once regarded as making them modern was instead hindering their societies’ 
progress. Democracy was not promoting, but, rather, hindering economic progress. This essay will explore the 
historic relation between capitalism (as Latin America entered into a period of export-oriented capitalist growth) 
and democracy (in a nineteenth century in which most of the world’s republics were in Latin America).
K E Y WO R D S  | Capitalism; Colombia; democracy; Mexico; nineteenth century; political culture; republicanism
 “El camino de la dictadura”: erosión de la democracia y capitalismo a finales del siglo XIX en México y Colombia
R E S U M E N  | La primera erosión de la democracia en Latinoamérica no ocurrió en el siglo XX; ocurrió en el siglo 
XIX. Argumentaré que, para la década de 1850, había surgido una cultura política vibrante y democrática en 
México y Colombia. Sin embargo, en la década de 1870, un movimiento político que unía a liberales y conser-
vadores empezó a sospechar que las políticas democráticas que antes consideraban modernas estaban, en 
realidad, entorpeciendo el progreso de la sociedad. La democracia no estaba promoviendo, sino, por el contrario, 
obstaculizando el progreso económico. Este ensayo explorará la relación histórica entre capitalismo (a medida 
que Latinoamérica entraba en un periodo de crecimiento capitalista orientado a la exportación) y democracia 
(en un siglo XIX en el que la mayoría de las repúblicas del mundo estaban en Latinoamérica).
PA L A B R A S  C L AV E  | Capitalismo; Colombia; cultura política; democracia; México; republicanismo; siglo XIX
“O caminho da ditadura”: o declínio da democracia e o capitalismo no final do século XIX no México e na Colômbia
R E S U M O  | O primeiro declínio da democracia na América Latina não ocorreu no século XX, mas sim no XIX. 
Nesse sentido, argumento que, em 1850, uma cultura política vibrante e democrática surgiu no México e na 
Colômbia; contudo, na década de 1870, um movimento político que unia liberais e conservadores começou 
a suspeitar que as políticas democráticas que antes eram consideradas modernas na realidade estavam 
impedindo o progresso da sociedade. A democracia não estava promovendo, mas sim o contrário, obstacu-
lizando o progresso econômico. Este ensaio explora a relação histórica entre o capitalismo (à medida que a 
América Latina entrou em um período de crescimento capitalista orientado à exportação) e a democracia (em 
um século XIX em que a maioria das repúblicas do mundo estava nessa região).
PA L AV R A S - C H AV E  | Capitalismo; Colômbia; cultura política; democracia; México; republicanismo; século XIX
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In turn-of-the-century Mexico, the editors of La Gaceta 
Comercial surveyed the accomplishments of the 
decades-long project of national regeneration called 
the Porfiriato. Dismissing criticisms that President 
Porfirio Díaz’ long rule was undemocratic, they instead 
applauded the regime’s obtainment of order, thus allow-
ing material progress: “Men of experience care little or 
nothing if governments are republican or monarchical; 
what is important is that, under one name or the oth-
er, in this or that form, that they realize the ends of the 
State—security and justice, progress through order.”1 In 
both Mexico and Colombia, the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century witnessed projects to restrict vibrant, if 
often disorderly, democratic cultures, undertaken with 
the goals of promoting capitalist economic develop-
ment. This essay, after briefly exploring why we should 
consider mid-nineteenth-century Colombia and Mexi-
co as democratic, will focus on what those in control of 
the state thought they had to do to secure this capitalist 
development. In other words, in the context of already 
vibrant democratic experiments, what did the quest for 
capitalist development tell us about the historical rela-
tionship between capitalism and democracy around the 
world? In both Colombia and Mexico, the correlation 
was negative. Both Liberal and Conservative politi-
cal elites determined that too much democracy was 
inimical to capitalist development. Thus, both acted 
(Mexico successfully, Colombia much less so) to restrict 
democracy and promote capitalism (part of a broader 
erosion of democratic culture across the hemisphere, I 
will suggest). Both Mexico and Colombia provide here-
tofore-unutilized case studies—since Latin America 
is a region of the world not much considered in these 
scholarly arguments—for a long-running debate, both 
scholarly and popular, over the historic relationship 
between democracy and capitalism.
The historic relationship between democracy and cap-
italism is the rare debate that ignites both scholarly 
(across numerous disciplines) and popular interest. 
The philosopher and public intellectual Slavoj Žižek, 
in reference to China’s present-day authoritarian cap-
italism, queried, “What if democracy is no longer the 
necessary and natural accompaniment of economic 
development, but its impediment?” (2009, A21). Fol-
lowing Žižek, most non-scholarly North Americans 
and many Western Europeans, especially politicians 
and public intellectuals, assume the relationship as 
positive, perhaps the two terms are perfect syn-
onyms: capitalism supports democracy and democracy 
supports capitalism. Martin Wolf (2016), the chief eco-
nomics commentator for the Financial Times, states, 
1 “Gobiernos caros y gobiernos baratos.” La Gaceta Comercial, 
2 March 1900. Emphasis in original. All translations mine, 
unless noted. I have included titles and authors for newspaper 
articles when available; however, many articles in nineteenth-
century newspapers carried neither title nor author, reflecting 
instead the general editorial slant of the paper.
“A natural connection exists between liberal democ-
racy…and capitalism.”2 Among historians and social 
scientists there is less consensus. Many assert, there 
exists a strong, positive connection between capital-
ism and democracy (if framed often as unintended 
consequences of capitalist development). Others see 
no correlation between the two processes or even 
argue that the two are historically antagonistic.3 This 
project will explore how, in Mexico and Colombia, the 
massive expansion of capitalism (or at least the desire 
to join an Atlantic capitalist system) led to the erosion, 
if not complete destruction, of democracy in those 
two societies (and, I will suggest, weakened democrat-
ic culture across the hemisphere).
A new wave of research has reassessed the histo-
ry of democracy in Latin America. An older master 
narrative gave Latin America no role in the world his-
tory of democracy, at least in the nineteenth century. 
While most Spanish American states were republics, 
these were largely seen as anarchic failures, panto-
mimes of true democracies. However, new research 
has re-examined nineteenth-century Latin America’s 
political and cultural history, recovering a rich, vibrant 
experimentation with democracy and republicanism, 
promoted especially by popular actors. Whether mea-
sured through voting, constitutional guarantees for 
individual rights, daily democratic practices (attending 
legislative sessions in the galleries, demonstrations, 
political clubs), or Latin Americans’ own sense of their 
societies’ success in creating democratic republics, 
Spanish America appears at the vanguard of the world 
history of democracy, especially compared to the Unit-
ed States (due to racial restrictions) or Europe (due to 
class restrictions).
The vindication of democracy’s history, however, 
necessitates a reconsideration of the interaction 
of capitalism and democracy as well. If Mexico and 
Colombia were democratic in the 1860s and 1870s, 
these democratic republics collapsed over the next 
two decades. Why? This collapse happened at the 
same time as the expansion of capitalism through the 
region, after decades of economic stagnation. Was 
this rise of capitalism and the fall of democracy simply 
coincidence or were causal factors at work? Finally, 
how do Mexico’s and Colombia’s histories fit into the 
larger debate on the historical relationship between 
capitalism and democracy?
2 Wolf was speaking of this historic relationship; he is much 
less sanguine about current prospects.
3 For both a review of the literature and one of the most sophis-
ticated proponents of the positive link, see Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens, and Stephens (1992) .
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The Debate
Whether capitalism foments democracy (or vice-versa) 
or whether capitalism restricts democracy (or vice-ver-
sa) has engendered reams of debate (Almond 1991; Noble 
1985). The argument most accepted by the public, at 
least in the North Atlantic, is that the two are mutually 
reinforcing. This argument does not lack for scholarly 
defenders, the grandfather of whom was Schumpeter, 
who argued “historically, the modern democracy rose 
along with capitalism, and in causal connection with it” 
(1975 [1942], 296); Schumpeter was not making a general 
statement, he was referring to “bourgeois democracy,” 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth century (he then 
argued that in the post-war future, majorities will use 
democracy to press for socialism) (1975 [1942], 297). 
Perhaps the most ardent proponent has been Milton 
Friedman: “History suggests only that capitalism is a 
necessary condition for political freedom” (Friedman 
and Friedman 1962, 10). He claims, “The kind of eco-
nomic organization that provides economic freedom 
directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes 
political freedom…” (Friedman and Friedman 1962, 9). 
Peter Berger agrees, arguing that “capitalism creates 
‘escape hatches’ from political power” that prevent 
totalitarianism; therefore, “Capitalism is a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition of democracy” (1986, 
80-81).4
Friedman’s ideas have not faded over time but been 
modified by other scholars. David Landes echoes Fried-
man: “…freedom is a necessary if not sufficient condition 
of development” (1999, 432). In a 2010 survey of the his-
tory of capitalism, Joyce Appleby agrees with Friedman 
on the congruity between democracy and capitalism, 
but she sees the two as mutually reinforcing, instead 
of democracy arising from capitalism. For her, democ-
racy foments capitalism; English political freedoms and 
open political culture led to the cultural values that 
fostered capitalism (Appleby 2010, 87-120).5 She then 
proceeds to argue that capitalism’s attacks on tradition 
and listless aristocracy, and its openness to talent and 
positive view of change, helped promote democracy. 
She concludes that the culture of capitalism in the West 
“is also the culture that nurtured natural rights, democ-
racy, and a humanitarian sensibility” (2010, 162).6
Most of these studies do not consider Latin America 
at all (a problem we will discuss more below), but one 
of the most influential, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and 
Stephens’ Capitalist Development and Democracy, does. 
The authors’ sophisticated analysis does not just make 
4 See also Fukuyama (1992, 107-108).
5 Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argue that greater equality 
promotes markets, which allows capitalist industrialization.
6 Later in the book, she qualifies this claim, given China’s rise 
(Appleby 2010, 162, 159-162, 174, 362, 366, 433-434).
assumptions about the two institutions’ compatibility, 
but carefully considers how capitalism changes societies 
and how these changes affect democracy’s chance for 
success. They argue, “Rather—we conclude—capitalist 
development is associated with democracy because it 
transforms class structure, strengthening the working 
and middle classes and weakening the landed upper class” 
(Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 7).7 One of 
the most widely used texts on Latin American politics, 
by Peter Smith, also sees a strong correlation between 
economic development and the initiation of democratic 
regimes in the early twentieth century (2005, 50).8
Other scholars, following Marx’ classic texts, argue the 
opposite, that capitalism is inimical to democracy. Marx 
argued that capitalism and democracy would enter into 
a “comprehensive contradiction”: either workers will 
use their greater numbers to obtain power via democra-
cy and then restrict capitalist exploitation, or capitalists 
will have to subvert democracy to contain such a threat 
(1895 [1850], 69). Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh 
(2000) have shown how hostile eighteenth-century 
capitalists were to any democratic movements by the 
poor. Curiously, conservative economists and political 
scientists, especially Milton Friedman, have argued 
that modern welfare democracy is a threat to capital-
ism, as the state erodes capital’s independence and free 
market operation (Almond 1991, 470-472).
This side of the debate, that questions the positive cor-
relation of capitalism and democracy, has found much 
more reception among Latin Americanists. Guillermo 
O’Donnell’s pioneering work on bureaucratic author-
itarianism described the “marked elective affinity” 
between capitalist modernization and dictatorships 
(but focused on the second half of the twentieth centu-
ry) (1979, 198). As Jeremy Adelman notes, “In contrast to 
Anglo-America, the cradle of many theories about the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between capitalism 
and democracy, South America is often portrayed as 
an inversion, the region in which the structure of cap-
italism undermined democracy or where democratic 
activity strangled capitalist development” (2003, 280). 
Adelman argues that democracies were never strong or 
legitimate enough in Latin America to survive changes 
to the economic moment in which they were conceived, 
falling apart under economic stress (Adelman 2003). 
While Adelman focuses on contingency,9 for other 
7 Huntington (1991, 59-72, 311) also sees a positive correlation 
between economic development and democracy. Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2006, 32-33) come to a somewhat similar 
conclusion, arguing that capitalist industrialization creates 
a non-landed elite more willing to tolerate democracy (and 
more fearful of provoking a revolution) than an elite whose 
economic base is land.
8 He sees such correlation breaking down later in the century.
9 Contingency and ambiguity also seems to be the approach 
of many scholars of capitalism (and democracy) in 
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Latin Americanists, such as Atilio Boron (following 
O’Donnell), it is accepted that the military coups of the 
1960s and 1970s proved that capitalist development 
could not tolerate democracy (1995, 2).
A third group (to which Adelman partially belongs) 
sees no intrinsic, necessary relation between capital-
ism and democracy (Karl 2018).10 Phillipe Schmitter and 
Terry Karl do see a general “long-term compatibility 
between democracy and capitalism,” but not an essen-
tial relationship (1991, 86). John Mueller argues that 
they are “quite independent: each can exist without the 
other” (1999, 231). A 2000 study by political scientists 
concluded that there was no direct link between the 
establishment of democracies and economic devel-
opment, but that once established, high economic 
development all but ensures democracies’ survival 
(Przeworski et al. 2000, 269-278). As with most of the 
social science studies mentioned, no attention was paid 
to pre-twentieth-century political experiments.
As with this last study, a central problem for this paper is 
that very few of these works consider Latin America at 
all, and when they do, they only examine the twentieth 
century. Nineteenth-century Latin America is basically 
not considered in these arguments, and the assumption 
has been that it has not been democratic (or, at times, 
capitalist). Friedman sees political freedom as develop-
ing in and a product of the “Western world” (Friedman 
and Friedman 1962, 9). Latin America, not part of the 
West in this vision, is thus not very interesting for 
the study of the relationship between democracy and 
capitalism. As Niall Ferguson bluntly stated, the only 
relevant question is “Why did capitalism and democra-
cy fail to thrive in Latin America?” (2011, 119).
Democracy in Nineteenth-Century  
Latin America
Ferguson is wrong about both democracy and capitalism 
in Latin America. However, he is in good company, at 
least until recently. As noted above, few scholars inter-
ested in the question of the world history of capitalism 
and democracy have included nineteenth-century 
Spanish America in their studies, casually dismissing 
the region’s nineteenth-century history as enjoying no 
democracy. Samuel Huntington asserts Latin America 
“has had a corporatist, authoritarian culture” (1996, 46) 
which was “opposed to the capitalism and democracy 
of the West” (1996, 149). Deborah Yashar is succinct: 
twentieth-century Mexico and Colombia (Karl 2018; 
Gillingham and Smith 2014; Walker 2013; Offner 2019; 
López-Pedreros 2019).
10 Barrington Moore 1966 traces how capitalism (and a 
strong bourgeoisie) could lead to democracy under certain 
conditions (a weak peasantry and a compliant aristocracy), 
but to fascism under others.
“Until recently, democracy has appeared elusive in 
Latin America” (2003, 302). Paul Cartledge (2016), in his 
comparison of ancient and modern democracy, does not 
even mention Spanish America (with the standard focus 
on Britain, the United States, and France). John Mueller 
also assumes that democracy has no long history in 
Latin America; historically, he sees the United States 
promoting democracy in the region (largely false, of 
course) against a balky Latin American pupil (1999, 217). 
Thomas Bender contrasts U.S. political development 
with Latin America: “Still, the practice of politics—the 
political culture—was friendlier to democratization 
in North America than in South America. Social and 
political developments in the United States—driven in 
part by competing elites and a two-party system—were 
within decades opening opportunities for white males, 
but such was not the case in the newly independent 
South American countries” (2006, 100). As we will dis-
cuss below, this is incorrect.
Even the careful Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 
do not largely study the nineteenth century, as they see 
no effective democracy there, due to a limit of state 
consolidation; “initial democratization” in the region 
took place in the twentieth century (1992, 197).11 Indeed, 
their assertion that contestation had to be institutional, 
and not armed resistance, seems logical. However, they 
do examine the nineteenth-century United States and 
Europe (and twentieth-century Latin America), when 
states faced much armed resistance (Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 83-132). As I will argue 
below, Mexico and Colombia seem to fit their defini-
tions of democracy (at least as well as, if not better than, 
many European states for which they do consider nine-
teenth-century developments). While Smith criticizes 
scholars for their “shortsightedness” of only looking 
at the past few decades when studying Latin American 
democracy, he begins his own in-depth study, his first 
cycle of democracy, in 1900 (2005, 12 [quote], 20-22).
Perhaps this is not surprising, for until the late 1990s, 
the scholarly consensus among Latin Americanists 
themselves was that the nineteenth century was 
decidedly undemocratic. Howard Wiarda sees 
democracy as essentially alien to Latin America’s 
founding principles, which were feudal, statist, and 
corporatist (2001, 8).12 Ronald Schneider also under-
stands democratic practices as essentially “alien” to 
the nineteenth-century Latin American character and 
experience, in which patron-client politics and violence 
ruled (2007, 6). Lawrence Harrison simply dismisses any 
history of democratic republicanism in the region until 
the late twentieth century (1997, 2).13 Miguel Centeno 
sees Latin American states as basically “despotic,” if 
11 See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 18).
12 See also Duncan (1976, 17-18) and Worcester (1992).
13 See also Fernández-Armesto (2003, 133-134).
27D O S S I E R
“The Path of Dictatorship”: The Erosion of Democracy and Capitalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico and Colombia | James E. Sanders 
very weak (2002, 10). Even scholars who reject simplis-
tic notions that Latin American culture was anathema 
to democracy, only see democracy arriving late to the 
scene. The popular idea of three waves of democracy in 
Latin America (beginning in early twentieth century from 
above, then populist movements, then post-military 
coup re-establishments) dominated. Most of the critical 
studies of democracy, capitalism, labor, and the state 
that appeared before the late 1990s take their starting 
point as 1900 or later (Collier and Collier 1991). Thus, any 
examination of the relationship between capitalism and 
democracy in Latin America would have to start in the 
twentieth century, since Latin America was not demo-
cratic in the nineteenth.
However, in the last twenty years there has been a major 
re-examination of the power, efficacy, and importance 
of democracy and republicanism in nineteenth-cen-
tury Spanish America. These new political cultures 
emerged during the Independence era, strengthening 
around mid-century, for example, in Colombia with the 
Liberal Party’s election in 1848. In Mexico, the same 
culture was more disrupted by foreign and domestic 
warfare, but began (in earnest) in 1854 with the peri-
od known as La Reforma and accelerated in the battle 
against Maximilian’s invading French army (who allied 
with Mexican conservatives [1861-1867]). The epoch of 
greatest democratic experimentation (after many radi-
cal experiments during the Independence Era) was thus 
a period of Liberal rule; Liberals in both Mexico and 
Colombia sought to increase individual freedom—polit-
ically (expanding citizenship, enacting a broad array of 
rights), economically (abolishing slavery in Colombia, 
terminating monopolies), and culturally (embracing a 
vision of American democratic republicanism against 
European despotism).14 As we will see below, popular 
groups, both urban and rural, embraced their own 
visions of these reforms; indeed, it was popular groups 
who often created and promoted this democratic 
culture, prodding along their elite Liberal allies, who 
accepted democratic changes as the price necessary 
to secure popular allies as voters and soldiers (in the 
numerous civil wars against Conservatives). Conser-
vatives, however, were much more suspicious about 
changes they dubbed “savage democracy.”15 Exploring 
how democratic Latin America was in the nineteenth 
century is an on-going project, involving scholars in 
Latin America, North America, and Europe (Sanders 
2104b; Sabato 2006 and 2018; López-Alves 2011; Cárde-
nas Ayala 2010; Aguilar Rivera 2019; Thomson 2007; 
Sala de Touron 2005; Vanegas Useche 2010). I will 
quickly argue that in the mid-nineteenth century, Latin 
14 For the independence era, see Lasso (2007) and Guerra (1992). 
For liberalism, see Hale (1989) and Jaramillo Uribe (1964).
15 Vicente Cárdenas to Sergio Arboleda, Quito, 19 November 
1878, Archivo Central del Cauca (Popayán, Colombia) 
(hereafter ACC), Fondo Arboleda, signatura 1,506.
America was as democratic as the United States and far 
more democratic than Europe, which are the regions 
regularly considered as the heartlands of democracy 
(and capitalism).
What is meant by democracy, however? There is some, 
if incomplete, consensus. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and 
Stephens define democracy as the state responding 
to representative rule, regular free and fair elections, 
freedom of expression and association, and the extent 
of the suffrage (1992, 10, 43). In a much-cited essay, 
Schmitter and Karl define democracy as involving 
accountability in the public realm of government to cit-
izens, who elect representatives, in a competitive and 
cooperative environment (1991, 76). Peter Smith defines 
democracy by three principles: participation (no large 
part of society is excluded from politics), competition 
(fair elections), and accountability (rulers must justify 
their actions to their citizens) (2005, 7). Democracy 
had a much more catholic and expansive meaning in 
nineteenth-century Spanish America itself, focusing 
on popular sovereignty and mass participation (the 
importance of popular pressure was critical), but also 
suggesting broad enjoyment of numerous rights (by all 
adult men, regardless of race and class), citizenship, and 
notions of liberty, equality and fraternity. Let us quick-
ly see how nineteenth-century Mexico and Colombia 
fit these definitions, which involve institutions, daily 
political practice, and political culture.
Institutionally, Colombia and Mexico’s constitutions 
of the period granted citizenship and voting rights 
to a wide swath, even universal at times, of the adult 
male population. Colombia eliminated all property and 
literacy rights for the suffrage in 1853, enacting unre-
stricted adult male suffrage (Pombo and Guerra 1986, 
8-10).16 Mexico came close to doing so in 1857, only 
demanding “an honest way of making a living” (Con-
stitución Federal 1857, 37; Arroyo García 2011). Voting 
is but one aspect of democracy, but it does allow easy 
comparisons to the deep restrictions on suffrage in the 
United States (due to racial restrictions) and to Europe 
(due to class restrictions). Indeed, the vast majority 
of European states only adopted universal manhood 
suffrage after World War I (Tilly 2004, 214). Histori-
ans have at times justified ignoring such impressive 
suffrage rights in Latin America due to the high levels 
of fraud in nineteenth-century elections.17 However, 
fraud was hardly only endemic to Latin America. As 
Boss Tweed himself declared, “The ballots made no 
result; the counters made the result” (Brands 2010, 
348). Yet, few historians dismiss the United States as 
undemocratic, even with fraud determining the out-
comes of national elections, such as in 1876. Even with 
16 The 1863 Colombian constitution allowed states to 
determine citizenship requirements.
17 Sabato critiques such historians (2018, 50-79).
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fraud, these institutional advances were not sterile, 
but reflected vibrant popular political activity. Popular 
groups vociferously defended their right to vote, pro-
testing fraudulent maneuvering. Indigenous people 
from small villages near Popayán, Colombia complained 
that local politicians illegally denied them the “right to 
vote that the law allows Granadan [Colombia was then 
known as Nueva Granada] citizens;” by doing so, these 
politicians “cheat the republic, rip apart our principles, 
[and] undermine republican truth.”18
Yet the right to vote is distinct from actual voting. As 
discussed above, the standard assumption is that mass 
participation in electoral politics (and thus democracy) 
did not begin until the 1940s. However, this is mostly 
just an assumption, as we still lack many local studies 
of voting patterns (Sabato 2018, 68). Yet, in Colom-
bia, we have some evidence that belies this notion of 
limited participation. In the 1856 Colombian presiden-
tial elections, for which solid election data exists, 40 
percent of eligible voters (all adult males, Colombia 
had enacted universal adult male suffrage) cast their 
ballots (Bushnell 1971, 242). In 1865, in Cali, Colombia, 
elections for the national congress enjoyed a voter par-
ticipation rate of over 57 percent (Sanders 2004, 127). 
While rates were generally significantly lower, one can 
no longer argue that elections were only of interest to 
the elite few. More important, however, is that studies 
of popular republicanism and democracy have shown 
that elections alone did not define nineteenth-century 
democracy, but that democratic culture was tightly 
linked to a broader popular republicanism (Vanegas 
Useche 2010, 11-46; Malamud 2007, 19-30).
Indeed, the repertoire of politics went far beyond voting; 
more important than looking at constitutions or elite 
opinion on democracy were the daily actions and reg-
ular discourse of the subaltern majority. Scholars have 
examined popular groups’ wide-ranging appropria-
tion of democratic and republican politics, via voting, 
petitioning, marching in demonstrations, serving in 
citizen militias, pressuring legislators from galleries, 
participating in local councils, attending political clubs, 
and generally debating the political issues of the day 
through the public reading of newspapers, listening to 
political oratory, and conversing among themselves, 
creating a democratic public sphere in town squares, 
village markets, churches, cockfighting pits, and tav-
erns.19 While Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens see 
capitalist development as helping to foment civil soci-
ety (a key support of democracy), Mexico and Colombia 
had relatively thriving civil societies before large-scale 
18 The undersigned residents of Silvia and Indians of Ambaló 
to Governor, Silvia, 8 August 1856, ACC, Archivo Muerto, 
paquete 62, legajo 45.
19 This literature has grown too vast to cite comprehensively. 
For a bibliographic review, see Sanders (2014a).
capitalist activity (1992, 6, 274); instead, later in the 
century, Mexico’s Porfiriato (1876-1911) and Colombia’s 
Regeneration (1870s-1890s) both worked to erode and 
debilitate civil society (especially any that had direct 
political ends).20 Before these restrictions, popular 
actors engaged in quotidian politics in support of Lib-
eral and Conservative Parties, both at the ballot box, 
in the town square to sway public opinion, and, during 
civil war, on the battlefield (the citizen-soldier was seen 
as key to republican citizenship). Bender argues that 
Latin America differed from North America since the 
American Revolution empowered popular groups, while 
in the south, “Strong military force was maintained with 
armies that were able and willing to return these groups 
to a condition of powerlessness” (2006, 99). This was not 
the case in the slightest, as popular groups wielded great 
influence in the face of weak Latin American states. 
Indeed, it would be popular groups’ power and influ-
ence, and the state’s weakness, that would turn many 
elites towards projects of national Regeneration (which 
entailed restricting democracy). But before this moment, 
whether measured by participation or by competition, 
Mexico and Colombia were demonstrably democratic.
Furthermore, popular groups clearly expected their 
participation to matter (accountability). Two petitions 
from indigenous peoples reveal how popular groups 
embraced the idea that in a democratic republic they 
were sovereign and the state had to respond to them. 
Indians from Huimilpan in central Mexico wrote to 
the state officials in 1856 to reclaim some land unjustly 
taken from them. Their strongest argument was that 
the Governor or President was beholden to them as a 
servant of the nation: a “republican magistrate” should 
dedicate himself “to serve the Pueblo who elevated 
him.”21 Similarly, Indians from Mocondino, in the Cau-
ca region of Colombia, expressed confidence that an 
“essentially democratic government,” in defense of 
which “we have shed so much blood,” would accede to 
their wishes not to have their communal lands divid-
ed.22 These indigenous villagers assumed the state 
would listen to them and act on their wishes, that 
they were citizens (which they legally were and which 
stands in stark contrast to the supposedly more demo-
cratic nineteenth-century United States), and that their 
citizenship mattered.
Culturally, and perhaps as important as this institution-
al and practiced democracy, mid-nineteenth-century 
20 For civil society, see Forment (2003) and Uribe-Uran (2000).
21 Trinidad García and 5 others to Ecsmo. Señor, Mexico, 30 
August 1856, Archivo General de la Nación (México), Insti-
tuciones Gubernamentales: Época Moderna y Contem-
poránea, Administración Pública Federal Siglo XIX, Fondo 
Justicia, Justicia, volumen 547, expediente 13,106.
22 El pequeño cabildo de Indíjenas de Mocondino to State 
President, Pasto, 18 February 1866, ACC, Archivo Muerto, 
paquete 94, legajo 54.
29D O S S I E R
“The Path of Dictatorship”: The Erosion of Democracy and Capitalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico and Colombia | James E. Sanders 
Spanish Americans thought of themselves as leading the 
world in democratic and republican practices. Indeed, 
they thought such practices defined their societies 
as modern, in contrast to a backward, monarchical 
Europe and a United States struggling with slavery 
and racism. In 1868, Mexico City’s La Opinión Nacional 
argued that “our triumphant democracy” in Mexi-
co had far surpassed Old World accomplishments.23 
Similarly, the capital’s La Chinaca declared that the 
future of democracy lay in the Americas: “today we 
sustain the banner of the democratic idea” against 
European tyrants.24 El Globo posited that while Europe 
and the United States measured progress through 
industrial and military might, Mexico insisted that its 
“republican virtue,” and democratic constitution best 
defined nineteenth-century civilization.25 In Colom-
bia, President José María Obando celebrated the 1853 
Constitution as “the most democratic code that has 
governed any pueblo.”26 If celebrating democracy and 
its values is an important part of actually having a 
democracy, in the 1860s, Mexico and Colombia, along 
with other American societies, were the most demo-
cratic countries in the world.
Therefore, using Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Ste-
phens’s, Schmitter and Karl’s, and Smith’s definitions 
(participation, competition, accountability), Mexico and 
Colombia were certainly democracies from the 1850s 
to 1870s (with the only caveat being regular elections, 
as elections were often interrupted by foreign and 
domestic war). Indeed, in regard to the extent of the 
suffrage (participation), Colombia and Mexico were two 
of the most democratic nations in the world, surpassing 
the United State (due to its racial restrictions) and most 
of Europe (due to class restrictions). Indeed, in a world 
where democracy and republicanism were tightly 
linked (but, of course, not synonymous), the vast major-
ity of the nineteenth-century world’s republics were 
in Latin America—in 1847, Europe only counted one 
(Hobsbawm 1996, 312). Yes, these were messy democra-
cies, often weakened by fraud, and with active plebeian 
voters and citizen soldiers, over whom fragile states 
struggled to keep order. The weakness of the national 
state actually made governments more accountable, 
which perhaps reflected popular groups’ critical crite-
ria for democracy. Competition is more complex, as the 
party in power tended to dominate elections; however, 
there was intense electoral competition—indeed, com-
petition was so intense that it regularly spilled over 
into civil wars. Colombia and Mexico fit or surpass the 
23 La Opinión Nacional, 1 April 1868.
24 La Chinaca, 30 June 1862.
25 El Globo, 5 July 1867.
26 José M. Obando, “Mensaje del Presidente,” Bogotá, 1 February 
1854, Archivo General de la Nación (Bogotá) (hereafter 
AGNC), Fondo Archivo Histórico Legislativo Congreso de la 
República, 1854, Cámara, Correspondencia Oficial IV, 2.
standard definitions of democracy—it is simply a lack of 
order that often marks them as non-democratic. How-
ever, order itself is not inherently democratic—indeed, 
authoritarian regimes pride themselves on securing 
order. Yet conceptions of order were vitally import-
ant. My argument will hinge on how disorder came to 
define democracy in elite minds; therefore, to secure 
order and capitalist development, popular democracy 
had to be undone.
Capitalism and Democracy’s Erosion
By the 1870s, ruling Liberals in both Mexico and Colom-
bia, having defeated Conservatives on the battlefield 
and at the ballot box, began to question their own proj-
ect to promote democratic republicanism as the best 
path to creating modern societies (and their alliances 
with popular liberal voters and soldiers). They had long 
expected their political program would lead to econom-
ic success—freeing people politically would also free 
them economically. However, in the 1870s, Liberals in 
both Mexico and Colombia began to have severe doubts; 
democracy, especially popular democracy, did not seem 
to be leading to the same type of industrial capitalist 
success as was becoming increasingly evident in the 
United States. In fact, many began to suspect that not 
only was democracy not engendering capitalism, it was 
actually hindering it. Disorderly, demanding plebeians, 
civil wars, and general uncertainty prevented inter-
nal investment, but, more critically, given the relative 
paucity of liquid capital in both Mexico and Colombia, 
deterred foreign capital. (Indeed, while I want to stress 
commonalities across the Americas, the need for for-
eign capital, rather than an ability to rely on domestic 
capital as in the United States, made the restriction of 
democracy and the assurance of order even more criti-
cal in Mexico and Colombia). Independent or moderate 
Liberals in both societies now turned to new projects, 
called the Regeneration in Colombia and the Porfiriato 
in Mexico (although also called the Regeneration in the 
latter too), which would seek to rein in democracy and 
promote capitalist economic growth.27
As with democracy earlier, we need definitions. Seth 
Rockman has noted that, in the new histories of cap-
italism, “Few works in the field begin with an explicit 
statement of what the author means by capitalism” 
(2014, 442). Since capitalism is such a slippery concept, 
this is a tempting approach; however, I will use “capital-
ism” as a system in which capital has the ability, perhaps 
27 For economic histories, see Cosío Villegas (1965), Coatsworth 
(1981), Ocampo (1996), Kourí (2004), Palacios (1983), Valencia 
Llano (1988), and Knight (1986). For an interpretation that 
stresses relations to the coffee export sector, rather than 
views of democracy for understanding Colombian politics, 
see Bergquist (1986).
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predominant, to transform society.28The culture of cap-
italism is essential to understanding its evolution, as 
Appelby argues that “…people think that because econ-
omies are about material things, only material forces 
operate in it when in fact economies involve human 
beings who don’t do anything without an idea in their 
heads” (2010, 89). In the case of Mexico and Colombia, 
it is perhaps this desire for this transformation, the 
effort to attract capital, that is most important, rather 
than the effects of capital proper. I will therefore focus 
on the decisions (to restrict democratic culture and insti-
tutions) made by political actors, and how these actors, 
and the broader culture in which they lived, understood 
the relationship between capitalism and democracy. 29
As with studies of world democracy, late nine-
teenth-century Latin America is often left out of 
histories of capitalism, in spite of how capital was 
remaking those societies (Appleby 2010, 248). Indeed, 
this was not Mexico’s first capitalist moment. The Bajío 
region, especially in the late eighteenth century, was 
the most economically dynamic part of the Americas, 
with capital transforming relations of production in 
the silver mines and haciendas there (Tutino 2011). 
Yet Hidalgo’s rebellion (1810-1811) destroyed much of 
these changes, and it is hard to find much evidence that 
capital, which, while not unimportant, was transmogri-
fying society between the 1820s and the 1870s. Instead, 
great contests of politics and religion were by far more 
important. This changed beginning in the 1870s, as 
political and cultural elites began a program to reshape 
their societies in the hope of promoting capitalism.
Political elites in both Colombia and Mexico engaged 
in a titanic effort to redefine democracy, sovereignty, 
state power, and order in the public sphere. Democracy, 
once celebrated as a marker of Mexico and Colombia’s 
success in crafting modern societies, now became 
associated with the disorder, chaos, and rowdy plebe-
ians that impeded economic development.30 Mexico’s 
La República stated succinctly, “If we want to progress, 
we must avoid anything that could disturb the public 
order. Peace is necessary and indispensable for the 
28 Thus, this work follows an earlier, more culturally-centered 
Marx, versus a later modes of production-centered Marx 
(1964). For a somewhat similar definition, see Appleby (2010, 
6-7 and 118).
29 My methodology is the humanistic (or historical) method, 
somewhat akin to what political scientists call “process 
tracing.”
30 I am not arguing that disorder actually impeded economic 
development (it probably had less effects than assumed), only 
that elites thought it did (and acted on that supposition). For a 
critique of those assuming that order was key, see Deas (2011). 
For the surprising success of the economy in Michoacán in 
the early part of the century, see Chowning (1999).
fomenting of material improvements of a nation.”31 
In Colombia, the problem of “public order” was equal-
ly central; only with order could Colombia develop 
“its industries,” foment “railroads and every type of 
material improvements,” and thus obtain “true civili-
zation.”32 This point seems obvious: without peace and 
order, who would risk capital in railroads, mines, plan-
tations or factories? Yet, disorder had become strongly 
linked with democracy by the 1870s and 1880s. Secur-
ing order was not simply a matter of strengthening the 
state (although this was critical), but of redefining the 
political culture from one of popular sovereignty and 
democratic contestation, to one of order and authority.
For these Regenerations to work, the pueblo had to 
be forced to understand that their visions of and faith 
in democracy were no longer valid. In Colombia, Juan 
Ulloa argued “there is much work to be done in order to 
make the masses understand what real and true liberty 
and democracy are.”33 Needless to say, what Ulloa thought 
democracy meant was quite different from what the 
pueblo believed. In Mexico, the most sophisticated 
public proponents of the new Díaz system were the 
editors of La Libertad (including Justo Sierra, Mexico’s 
premiere late-century public intellectual). They argued 
that Mexico had to forget its democratic past, and face 
a future defined by the hard realities of capitalist devel-
opment instead of “an unrealizable democracy.” The 
poor should no longer place their hopes in a “promised 
land” of politics, but only in labor and work. 34 In Colom-
bia, President Miguel Antonio Caro argued in 1892 that 
constant “political activity” had left society in a state of 
“permanent upheaval,” “robbing minds and arms from 
industry and work” (Caro 1932, 56). Cali’s aptly named 
El Ferrocarril vociferously complained about “these too 
frequent elections” that “totally impede the progress 
of the country.” By ending the practice of constant 
elections, “citizens can dedicate themselves to their 
professions, without being distracted.” Indeed, “Epi-
demics, locusts, droughts, floods, hurricanes, storms, 
earthquakes, and famine; all these calamities...since 
they are transitory, pale in comparison to that great 
calamity of our elections.”35 Democracy, once a source 
of pride, was now simply a disaster or utopian dream. 
Economics, not politics, was the way forward.
A central factor that elites blamed for economic stag-
nation were the constant civil wars and upheavals that 
disturbed the peace in both Mexico and Colombia and 
31 La República, 29 August 1890. For positivism, see Hale (1989) 
and Peludo Gómez (2010).
32 “Hagamos algo serio (primer artículo).” El Deber, 1 October 1878.
33 Juan E. Ulloa to Salvador Camacho Roldán, Palmira, 19 June 
1879, AGNC, Sección Academia Colombiana de Historia, 
Fondo Salvador Camacho Roldán, caja 13, carpeta 166, 6.
34 La Libertad, 27 December 1884.
35 El Ferrocarril, 16 May 1879.
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deterred investment, both domestic and foreign. These 
civil wars were seen as tightly linked to, and perhaps 
the inevitable outcome of, the democratic politics of 
the previous decades. Bogotá’s El Conservador com-
plained about Colombians’ pride in their democratic 
republic: “Talking incessantly about liberty, and with 
the presumption of being the freest nation in the 
world,” had reduced Colombia “almost to the level of 
barbarians.” Colombia was a “pueblo whose industry” 
was not advanced enough to break the bad habits of 
“anarchy” and “disorder” that plebeians had learned 
during civil wars.36 Colombian elites complained about 
plebeians’ unwillingness to labor and the “demoral-
ization of the masses accustomed to life in the army 
camps.”37 Democratic politics simply lead to civil wars 
and disorders—an “abominable anarchy” or the spread 
of “the virus of anarchy.”38
Capital and industry could correct such evils. Politicians 
in both Colombia and Mexico hoped that a focus on 
labor would civilize the poor, “distracting them from 
sterile political discussions.”39 El Ferrocarril argued 
that railroads created peace and prosperity, since 
by demanding cargo, they expanded agriculture and 
mining. Instead of being involved in politics, citizens 
“will try to become rich” and “being property holders 
and educated, will come to constitute one of the best 
elements of order.”40 Mexico’s El Siglo Diez y Nueve 
echoed this sentiment, declaring that with the spread 
of commerce following the steam engine’s tracks, 
“the agitated spirit of political contests will direct and 
apply its activity to other enterprises and labors.”41 
Democracy impeded capitalism; but, as El Conservador 
suggested and Díaz explicitly stated in an interview, 
perhaps one day, capitalist development might allow 
for more democracy (Creelman 1908).
As with the passage from La Gaceta Comercial that 
opened this essay, more and more politicians and intel-
lectuals began to declare that it really did not matter if a 
society’s form of government was democratic or repub-
lican or even monarchial, but that it kept order and 
36 El Conservador, 21 March 1882, found in the papers of Sergio 
Arboleda, ACC, Fondo Arboleda, Signatura 174.
37 C. de la Cadena to Salvador Camacho Roldán, Cali, 1 
November1878, AGNC, Sección Academia Colombiana de 
Historia, Fondo Salvador Camacho Roldán, caja 6, carpeta 61, 
14. 
38 For first quotation, see El 21 de Abril, 18 May 1879; for second 
quotation, see El Correo Nacional, 7 January 1891.
39 Francisco Marulanda to Julián Trujillo, Popayán, 20 
November 1880, AGNC, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Enrique 
Ortega Ricaurte, Serie Generales y Civiles, caja 93, carpeta 
342, p. 18,184; for Mexico, see La Libertad, 8 November 1884. 
See also, Weiner (2004, 25-47).
40 El Ferrocarril, 1 March 1878.
41 El Siglo Diez y Nueve reprinted in El Aguijón, 10 June 1872.
promoted economic growth. While Liberals had for-
merly celebrated revolutions that installed democratic 
governments, El Ferrocarril vociferously objected: “We 
declare ourselves against all revolutions, because we are 
convinced that the worst government is better than 
the most perfect revolution.”42 What mattered in a gov-
ernment was for rights and property to be respected, 
regardless of its form. Bogotá’s El Deber argued that the 
world did not admire Colombia for its republicanism, 
but instead saw its disorder as a “scandal” that threat-
ened property rights; thus, securing such rights was 
the most important aspect of government, not whether 
its form was that of a monarchy or republic.43
Others went even further, openly advocating for a 
dictatorship that would emerge in all but name under 
the Porfiriato in Mexico. In Colombia, the Independent 
Liberal (a faction of Liberals aligning themselves with 
Conservatives) Foción Mantilla wanted a government 
that would “only attend to the salvation of order, even 
at the cost of a dictatorship.”44 Eliseo Payán, once a fer-
vent democrat but later President of Colombia under 
the Regeneration, in 1880 declared that due to chronic 
instability and “the violent attack on property” that 
Colombia had suffered, “capital had fled or is hidden,” 
while “industry is annihilated;” therefore, to correct 
these evils, “the path of dictatorship is considered justi-
fiable as the way to obtain order and peace.”45 The needs 
of capital could justify a dictatorship.
Mexico followed the “path of dictatorship” most 
successfully. José Ramón Leal, in a series of letters 
published in México’s influential El Siglo Diez y Nueve, 
praised the Díaz regime as “the future.” He argued 
that Mexico had to turn away from internecine poli-
tics to instead focus on trade and industry: “the time 
has arrived to leave behind all other concerns in order 
to unite in a reciprocal and common interest, through 
relations of industry, contract, and commerce, that is 
the urgent necessity of modern life.” Instead of the old 
republican hostility to Spain, Mexico should imitate 
its “moderate monarchy.” Mexico’s past of democratic 
politics mattered not. Today “civilization” was defined 
as a “workshop;” those nations not active and working 
would soon be passed by in the race to progress. Key to 
this progress was that Mexico adopt technologies like 
the telegraph and railways, but also take advantage of 
42 El Ferrocarril, 31 October 1879.
43 “Sistema Representativo.” El Deber, 18 March 1879.
44 Foción Mantilla to Salvador Camacho Roldán, Popayán, 4 
December 1878, AGNC, Sección Academia Colombiana de 
Historia, Fondo Salvador Camacho Roldán, caja 9, carpeta 
104, 1. 
45 Speech of Eliseo Payán to Congress, Bogotá, 8 April 1880, 
Rejistro Oficial (Popayán), 1 May 1880.
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“the marvels of credit.”46 Credit was essential: it was “the 
motor force of modern life.”47 But to do so, it would 
have to abandon its old democratic concerns: “Political 
science knows nothing more lamentable than those 
Republics where everyone leads and no one obeys…” 
Leal closed his argument by noting that if necessary, to 
secure order and develop the economy, “a healthy dic-
tatorship” would be the most propitious path.48 Leal’s 
essays show the tight connection between dismissing 
democracy and the promotion of capital as the main 
“motor force” in society.
Justo Sierra was not as blunt as Leal in his promotion 
of dictatorship, but he associated the Porfiriato even 
more closely with capitalism. In his survey of Mexi-
can history, Sierra contrasted the great political gains 
made under the liberal President Benito Juárez and the 
Reform in the 1850s and 1860s, with the poor state of 
Mexico’s economy and society. Sierra argued that the 
Reform’s promotion of “democracy,” and its handmaid-
ens of liberty and equality, had not magically produced 
“wealth and credit and material progress” (1948a, 173). 
He approvingly noted that under Díaz, “Mexico’s polit-
ical evolution has been sacrificed to other phases of its 
social evolution” (Sierra 1977, 396). While too suave to 
call Díaz a dictator, Sierra dismissed voting irregulari-
ties and Díaz’ multiple terms in office (1977, 393). In order 
to secure the “order and peace” necessary for industri-
al development (and Sierra was explicitly comparing 
Mexico to the United States), Díaz often had to turn to 
“fear, the ultimate resort of government” (1977, 386, 
389). Díaz had to be re-elected constantly and assume 
“the maximum amount of authority in his hands,” in 
order to protect Mexico’s foreign credit, “without 
which it would not have been possible to find the neces-
sary funds in order to complete the great works of the 
future”—the railroads and infrastructure necessary for 
capitalist development (Sierra 1977, 393). Sierra plain-
ly stated that Díaz’ project represented “the Mexican 
bourgeoisie” (1977, 388).
By the 1880s, politicians and letrados had succeeded in 
both Colombia and Mexico in redefining, in the public 
sphere, the importance and meaning of democracy. 
Yet as important as this discursive assault was, it was 
accompanied (if more slowly and often less success-
fully) by a change in the institutions of political life. 
In Colombia, this was marked by a new constitution in 
1886, which rolled back many of the rights of previous 
46 José Ramon Leal. “Cartas íntimas a mi amigo Don Emilio 
Castelar: Séptima.” El Siglo Diez Y Nueve, 15 September 1884.
47 José Ramón Leal. “Cartas íntimas a mi amigo Don Emilio 
Castelar: Undécima.” El Siglo Diez Y Nueve, 13 October 
1884. The Colombian paper, La Luz, argued, “we want to 
consolidate the foundation of every civilized society, which 
is credit…” “La paz.” La Luz, 1 March 1881.
48 José Ramón Leal. “Cartas íntimas a mi amigo Don Emilio 
Castelar: Séptima.” El Siglo Diez Y Nueve, 15 September 1884.
constitutions. Independent Liberals had long sought 
to restrict access to politics, as “every political man 
should be wise;” they claimed that only Radical Liberals 
still believed in “popular sovereignty.”49 Independents 
and Conservatives urged for the new constitution to 
restrict citizenship and suffrage. La Nación, in an article 
probably written by the former progressive Liberal, 
José María Samper, argued that a “democratic republic” 
was only possible in a well-educated people with a “uni-
ty of race,” conditions that “Hispanic America” lacked. 
“That which we have in Colombia is a social mass (nine 
tenths of the total population) that does not know nor 
understand a single word of republic, of democracy, of 
principles, of rights or duties, of what civilization and 
progress is, because it is generally ignorant, coarse, 
half-savage.” Colombia’s mistake was to insist on 
democracy, when in reality only a small group of men 
should be involved in politics, men of “intelligence, 
enlightenment, wealth, and temperament.”50 He pro-
posed that voting was not a “right” because if it were, 
then women, children, criminals, drunkards, foreign-
ers, and the insane could vote. Therefore, it was “the 
state, and only the state, that can grant the suffrage.” 
Colombia had adopted “universal suffrage” in the 1853 
Constitution, an “error” that did not take into account 
“that we did not have a people able to exercise that 
supposed right with diligence, with independence, and 
with morality.” Samper argued that “to vote well” men 
must be intelligent, informed, and have an “indepen-
dent” life, in other words, they must be propertied.51
The 1886 Constitution hewed to these arguments. 
Most notably, it established literacy and property 
requirements for citizenship, reduced the frequency 
of elections (as El Ferrocarril had implored), reinstated 
the death penalty, and outlawed popular political orga-
nizations. Colombia’s Regenerators had struck hard at 
the vibrant democratic life of the mid-century. More 
laws followed. In 1888, Colombia’s press law forbade 
any “subversive publications,” which included print-
ing anything attacking the Church, offending civil or 
ecclesiastical authority, insulting the military, informa-
tion that might depreciate money, obscenity, “attacking 
the legitimate organization of property,” “inciting some 
social classes against others,” and “taking the name and 
representation of the pueblo.”52 A public order law, 
enacted later that year, gave the president the power 
to imprison or exile anyone who was a threat to order 
or had committed “attempts against public or private 
49 “Hagamos algo serio (segundo artículo).” El Deber, 4 
October 1878.
50 “La revolución y la república.” La Nación, 17 November 1885.
51 “Sistema electoral.” La Nación, 3 November 1885.
52 Law of 17 February 1888 (#151) in El Heraldo, 4 July 1889.
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property.”53 The laws made clear the link between 
restricting popular democracy, increasing state power, 
and protecting property and capital. Capital had to be 
sacrosanct and the poor had to be quiescent.
Ironically, Colombia’s Regeneration, in spite of its sharp 
institutional delineation between the old order and the 
new, never succeeded in maintaining order (the brutal 
civil War of the Thousand Days would convulse the 
country from 1899-1902) or fomenting as much capi-
talist development as in Mexico.54 Only after the War 
of the Thousand Days was a program as coherent as 
Mexico’s Porfiriato initiated (and much foreign capital 
invested) (Bergquist 1986, 195-246).
In Mexico, Díaz had not come to power with an anti-dem-
ocratic or pro-capitalist plan. His Plan de la Noria (issued 
in 1871 in a first, failed attempt to oust the Juaristas) was, 
in fact, largely a promise to reinvigorate and respect a 
popular liberalism that had flourished in Mexico over 
the previous two decades, especially during the war 
against Maximilian and the French (Mallon 1995, 129-
133). Even years later, this is how poor farmers and 
ex-soldiers understood Díaz’ program (Sanders 2014b; 
McNamara 2007). However, once in power, Díaz not 
only pursue distinct policies (that were anti-democrat-
ic and pro-capitalist), he and his supporters created a 
whole new justification for state power and the relation 
between the pueblo and the state. Mexico’s Regenera-
tors did not create a new constitution, in spite of Sierra’s 
urge to abandon “universal suffrage” in favor of literacy 
tests to exclude the “ignorant multitude” (Sierra 1948b, 
147-148). Elections continued apace. But Díaz would 
rule Mexico from 1876 until 1911, with one brief inter-
regnum when his handpicked successor was President. 
After this interregnum, as Díaz took office again in 1884, 
it became clear where true power lay and elections 
became more and more of a sham. Indeed, as late as 1910, 
the massively influential científico José Yves Limantour 
was still convinced that forty years of the Porfiriato had 
not prepared the people for democracy; it had not suc-
ceeded in educating the “masses from their ignorance 
about the most elemental rights of citizenship…[and] the 
manner to exercise those rights” (1965 [1921], 155). There 
was often not even the pretension of a democracy or a 
republic. Thus, while the official institutions changed 
slowly (centrally appointed jefes políticos gained much 
more power over local life, the country lawyers who 
helped the poor craft petitions and make demands of the 
state were banned in 1891 [Schaefer 2017]), the change 
in political culture was more rapid and stark. While the 
politics of political alliances and local power may have 
53 “Ley 61 de 1888,” Bogotá, 25 May 1888, La Nación, 12 June 
1888. See also Delpar (1981, 144) and Bergquist (1986, 37-38).
54 Even though it largely failed, the assumption was that 
the Regeneration would lead to great gains in mining, 
agriculture and industry. “Algo sobre industria II.” La 
Nación, 1 December 1885.
taken decades to evolve under the Porfiriato (Mallon 
1995, 319), the anti-democratic and pro-capitalist rhet-
oric emerged impressively quickly.55
In both Mexico and Colombia, these institutional and 
discursive shifts away from democracy also involved 
an embrace of state power in order to foment change 
(especially the ability to attract capital) and to act 
independently of popular (or even elite) groups. Regen-
erators had long chafed over plebeians’ assumption 
they should be able to influence the state. El Ferrocarril 
argued that the state must be strong enough to prevent 
anarchy and to guarantee the right of property above 
all else.56 Regenerators asserted that property rights 
were the basis of all “social order,” and that the state 
had to ensure that “property is inviolable.”57 In both 
Colombia and Mexico, elites were greatly concerned 
about popular groups’ demands for land, to the point 
that in Colombia some worried that popular politics 
“had sowed in the poor populations the seed of commu-
nism.”58 The state’s assurance of property rights against 
democratic pressure would be central to attracting 
capital to agriculture. Independent Liberals and Con-
servatives were particularly horrified by democratic 
efforts to redistribute land in Cauca; they argued “the 
necessity to maintain the idea of the right of property, 
above all of landed property, as sacred and inviolable. 
This is the cornerstone on which the progress of mod-
ern societies is built.” Only with secure property could 
Colombia “inspire confidence in order to attract…the 
support of foreign industry and capital.”59
Strong states could protect property and resist the 
democratic influence of popular pressures, with a focus 
on repressing democratic plebeians in order to attract 
capital. Francisco de la Fuente Ruiz praised Díaz’ newly 
potent state; he marveled at how the “popular masses” 
were no longer interested in politics; indeed, “they 
seem to have spontaneously renounced” the political 
life.60 La Libertad argued, “The State is not a servant of 
the nation to whom it owes services in exchange for 
55 Other scholars take the opposite tack, seeing no difference 
between the Porfiriato and Juárez regimes (and thus not 
recognizing any democratic elements in Mexico). See 
Boron (1995, 9, 16-18) and Córdova (1973) . One problem with 
this interpretation is that most Mexican Regenerators 
themselves would have thought this ridiculous, seeing their 
project as a decisive break with the past.
56 El Ferrocarril, 1 August 1879.
57 “Hagamos algo serio (artículo cuarto).” El Deber, 15 October 
1878 (first quote); Alejandro Micolta to Deputies, Popayán, 7 
September 1879, ACC, Archivo Muerto, paquete 146, legajo 3 
(second quote). 
58 “La paz.” La Luz, 1 March 1881.
59 Speech of President Julián Trujillo to Congress, Bogotá, 11 
May 1878, La Reforma, 18 May 1878.
60 Francisco de la Fuente Ruiz. “La situación política.” El 
Cosmopolita, 8 May 1884.
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taxes. The State does not offer services, but, rather, 
exercises its own functions, since it is a special body 
with society and superior to society.”61 Thus sovereign-
ty was defined as residing in the state itself, not in the 
pueblo, whose democratic demands the state could now 
ignore. And under Díaz, if less so in Colombia, the state 
did become much more powerful: using railroads, the 
telegraphs, and a stronger army, as well as Foucaultian 
knowledge of Mexico’s peoples and landscapes, to crush 
popular rebellions if needed (Craib 2004). Furthermore, 
if capitalist markets failed to transform Indians and 
campesinos into hard-working proletarians, the state 
would use its power to do so (Weiner 2004, 33-42). 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens argue, “Con-
solidation of state power was an essential prerequisite 
for democratization”62 (1992, 9). However, in Mexico 
and Colombia, the consolidation of state power destroyed 
or eroded existing democratic culture, especially the 
accountability of officials and popular sovereignty.
The relationship between state power, capital, and 
popular political influence was made clear in the 
1884 protests over payments of old Mexican debts to 
England. Foreign debt is often seen as forcing Latin 
American states into a dependent relationship with 
Europe and the United States, thereby determining 
local politics (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). While import-
ant, this is only part of the story, as the debt question 
was only part of a larger, internal debate in Mexico and 
Colombia about the nature of the state and its relation 
to democratic pressure.63 In Mexico, Francisco Cosmes 
supported paying the debt, in order to attract foreign 
capital. However, massive protests emerged in and 
around Congress, which was debating a deal to repay 
the debt. Cosmes declared that when the legislators 
debating the issue became influenced by the “ignorant 
mob” and the “tumult in the streets,” then state author-
ity will have collapsed. “The law of the riot” had replaced 
constitutional order. Cosmes insisted that “the passion 
of the masses” had to be ignored.64 For plebeians, the 
central notion of democracy was popular sovereignty, 
the idea that their voice mattered. For Cosmes, this 
democracy threatened state power and capital—it had 
to be muzzled. The protests were eventually crushed, 
with violence. La Libertad dismissed concerns that 
some protestors had been killed: “We lament that the 
merchant loses money, that the passer-by, his watch.” 
The paper stressed it was the duty of the state to guard 
61 La Libertad, 2 October 1884.
62 They do recognize that too strong a state can crush lower-
class democratic efforts.
63 While I am interested in broader, internal political issues of 
the debt question raised, debt repayment itself was also an 
important internal, rather than only foreign, question. See 
Tenenbaum (1986).
64 Francisco G. Cosmes. “La ley motín.” La Libertad, 22 
November 1884.
“the lives and interests of honorable citizens,” even 
at the cost of the protestors’ lives. The paper rebuked 
those who claimed the protestors had a right to march, 
declaring the Mexican workers were not yet ready 
to enjoy such rights responsibly—they would be too 
tempted to engage in attacks on property. These pro-
testors were not to be allowed to “force merchants 
to close their shops.”65 The question of what weighed 
more, democracy or capitalism, had been settled.
This new attitude of state power and popular rights 
applied to labor relations as well. After workers at 
a Puebla textile factory went on strike, La Libertad 
reminded the local governor that, “The supreme law 
is public security, and therefore you should punish the 
promoters of the strike.” The state was not beholden 
to rights, but to a higher call for order, necessary for 
industrial progress. The workers had pleaded their 
case to Díaz, whom the paper advised to tell the strik-
ers to go back to their labors, as only by working could 
they improve their lives.66 Rueschemeyer, Stephens, 
and Stephens argue that if capitalism helps democ-
racy, it is by strengthening the working class and 
weakening anti-democratic landlords (1992, 269-271). 
However, in late-nineteenth-century Mexico and 
Colombia, capitalism (or its contradictions) did nei-
ther; it weakened the political influence of nascent 
middle sectors and lower-class citizen-soldiers and 
increased the power of the landed elites, as the Por-
firiato promoted agricultural exports.
In short, in Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Colombia 
(where some harbored hopes for a nationally led indus-
trialization), Regenerators hoped to vitiate democracy 
in order to make local investors feel secure and to attract 
foreign capital.67 A writer from provincial Colombia 
celebrated the Regeneration as putting Colombia on the 
right path that would attract “capital for its develop-
ment.”68 Colombia’s Regenerators urged a buttressing 
of state power to ensure order: “with stability, finally, 
we will have domestic and foreign credit” and the 
country will attract “foreign capital.”69 Rafael Núñez, in 
a speech to the 1885-1886 Constitutional Convention, 
65 La Libertad, 22 November 1884; see also, Piccato (2010, 160-
161, 225).
66 “La huelga de Puebla II.” La Libertad, 2 October 1884.
67 Foreign capital played much less a role in Colombia, at 
least until after 1900. Regenerators hoped to stimulate 
domestic industry, via a National Bank and some (although 
insufficient) protectionism (Bergquist 1986, 40, 44; Bushnell 
1993, 145). Contrarily, after 1900, Mexico’s científicos began 
to pay more attention to domestic capital (Knight 1986, 
22-23). There is considerable debate over the Porfiriato’s 
conscious promotion (or lack thereof) of domestic industry. 
See Gómez-Galvarriato (2000).
68 Letter of A.J.B. Carmen. La Nación, 22 May 1888.
69 “Razón y objeto de este periódico.” La Nación, 15 September 
1885.
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argued that Colombia’s anarchic political system should 
be replaced by one that was more “authoritarian;” he 
justified this by noting how the nation’s disorder has led 
to “the absences of foreign credit that keeps us para-
lyzed due to a lack of railroads.”70
In Mexico, Sierra argued that by establishing a utopian 
democracy before the Porfiriato, “democracy without 
limits,” Mexico had not “maintained public securi-
ty in order to attract foreign immigrants or capital” 
(1948a, 174). But under Díaz, foreign capital, order, and 
progress were tightly intertwined. In Mexico, capi-
talists noted this connection as well; they confidently 
adopted a language of material “paths of Progress” and 
“the future,” as opposed to past economic stagnation, 
when petitioning for favors.71 Cotton producers on Mexi-
co’s Gulf Coast, requesting aid in adopting North American 
methods and machinery, claimed that by encouraging 
foreign immigration, attracting capital, putting fallow 
fields under production, and exporting cotton, they 
could increase production, help domestic industry and 
thus serve “the cause of civilization.” They explicitly 
used a language of attracting “capital” and “foreign cap-
ital and workers.”72 Surveying Díaz’ regime at the turn 
of the century, La Gaceta Comercial could approvingly 
note that by ending “our bloody discussions,”—politics 
in other words—Díaz had attracted the admiration of 
“all the world’s peoples.” Now, “the country is wrapped 
in a network of innumerable telegraphs and railways.” 
Most importantly, with order and peace, Mexico 
“attracts foreign capital.”73
Conclusion
In sum, the Colombian and Mexican cases both confirm 
and partially contradict the classic work of Rueschemey-
er, Stephens, and Stephens. As per their model, it was 
landed agrarian elites and an incipient bourgeoisie 
that were most hostile to democracy in Colombia and 
Mexico (1992, 5-6, 8). However, while they assert that 
capitalist development increases the opportunities for 
democracy (1992, 7), in nineteenth-century Mexico and 
Colombia, the desire for capitalist development (and 
in Mexico the reality of a quite impressive capitalist 
expansion) resulted in the destruction of two of the 
most democratic republics in the nineteenth-century 
70 Rafael Núñez. “Exposición sobre reforma constitucional,” 
Bogotá, 11 November 1885. La Nación, 13 November 1885.
71 Manuel María Alegre to President, México, 7 May 1885, 
Universidad Iberoamericana, Acervos Históricos (México) 
(hereafter UI), Colección Porfirio Díaz, legajo 10, caja 10, #4670.
72 Manuel María Alegre to President, México, 7 May 1885, UI, 
Colección Porfirio Díaz, legajo 10, caja 10, #4670.; Manuel 
María Alegre to Minster of Development, no place, [1885], 
UI, Colección Porfirio Díaz, legajo 10, caja 10, #4671.
73 “El Nuevo Siglo: Seguro Porvenir.” La Gaceta Comercial, 31 
December 1900.
world. In both countries, state makers sought to rein 
in vibrant mid-century popular democratic cultures 
in order to create the conditions necessary to foment 
internal investment and attract foreign capital.
These cases completely contradict Friedman’s model. 
In Mexico and Colombia, the desire for capitalism led 
to a combination of economic and political power to 
greatly limit political freedom, instead of ensuring it, 
as Friedman asserted. Perhaps needless to say, a sim-
ilar repression of democracy would happen a century 
later in Pinochet’s Chile, a favorite of Friedman’s eco-
nomic school. Likewise, Mueller (1999) theorizes a bit 
about how it is possible to have democracy without 
capitalism (and vice-versa), and how democracy might 
support capitalism, but he doesn’t think much about 
why capitalists might not want, and actively seek to 
undermine, democracy.
On the other end of the political spectrum from Fried-
man, Jodi Dean argues that democracy is perfectly 
compatible with, and indeed promotes, capitalism, 
by asking, “Why does the left continue to appeal to 
democracy?” “Real existing constitutional democra-
cies privilege the wealthy. As they install, extend, and 
protect neoliberal capitalism, they exclude, exploit, and 
oppress the poor…” (2009, 76). This assertion would 
have been nonsensical in the late nineteenth century, 
when democracy (embraced by and associated with the 
poor) was seen as the prime threat to capitalism.
I do not want to suggest that the Colombian and Mex-
ican cases demonstrate an incompatibility between 
capitalism and democracy in some regions, such as 
Latin America (whether due to the type of colonialism, 
timing of industrialization, dependency theory), and 
not in others, such as Europe or the United States. For 
the nineteenth century, it makes little sense to argue 
that capitalism and democracy were compatible in the 
North Atlantic, since democracy remained so contest-
ed and beleaguered in Europe during this time period. 
For the United States, the record is also not as clear as 
assumed. While the U.S. did not experience the extreme 
reversals Mexico and Colombia endured, scholars 
have noted how the late nineteenth century was a 
period that witnessed the erosion of democracy in the 
United States. Of course, there had long been tension 
between democracy and capitalism, since the north-
ern Republic’s founding. As Bender notes, “The men 
who went to Philadelphia were also concerned about 
protecting property from a covetous democracy that 
seemed rampant in the state legislatures” (2006, 104). 
However, the contradiction became more evident after 
the Civil War.
H.W. Brands convincingly argues that during the Gilded 
Age, “after almost a century during which the tide of 
democracy had risen ever higher, an ebb was setting in” 
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(2010, 407).74 This democratic retreat was marked by the 
end of Reconstruction (and freedpeoples’ demands for 
land and citizenship), the innumerable scandals of the 
post-bellum years, the machine politics that dominated 
urban public life, and the generally pitiful reputation 
and abilities of both Presidents and Congress (Brands 
2010). As in Colombia, suffrage was restricted, only 
mostly based on race in the United States, instead of 
class, as in Colombia. Francis Parkman, in the North 
American Review in 1878, declared, “the failure of uni-
versal suffrage.” He blamed capitalism, for creating an 
ignorant urban poor and nefarious ideas of equality 
(Brands 2010, 413). The tension between democracy and 
capitalism was felt across the Americas.
A key difference, I might hypothesize, is that the capital-
ist system was eroding democracy in the United States, 
while the desire for attracting the capital to create such 
a system was eroding democracy in Spanish America. 
One was the actions of thousands of businessmen and 
the politicians they bribed or with whom they shared 
ideological sympathies, the other was the project of a 
relatively few politically powerful men. Thus, while 
in the U.S., the attack on democracy was diffuse and 
sometimes behind the scenes, in Spanish America it 
was more open and stated. Also, the U.S. did not need 
to radically reform its republican government to crush 
industrial labor and ensure the safety of the capital; its 
elected representatives were more than willing to do 
this. In Colombia and Mexico, a much more aggressive 
rejection of democracy took place, perhaps because 
popular democracy was much more vibrant before its 
repression while the state was weaker. While the Unit-
ed States could rely on internal capital, Colombia and 
Mexico hoped to attract foreign capital. It was precisely 
in the 1870s that British capital especially began to seek 
more foreign concessions, “and demanded even greater 
guarantees” for profitable returns and risk minimization 
(Veeser 2013, 1138). Yet the Latin American experience 
cannot be reduced to dependent states dancing to the 
tune of foreign capitalists; the decisions were made local-
ly, and, for the most part, the restriction of democracy 
took place before much foreign investment.75
While foreign capital is important (and would grow 
increasingly so), I think the similarities in the Americas 
are equally germane (Veeser 2002). Foreign capital also 
played a role in the Panic of 1873 in the United States; the 
subsequent long depression created political instability 
that began to undermine the Reconstruction’s demo-
cratic possibilities (White 2017, 253-287). Both the U.S. 
and Spanish American states would use force to secure 
74 See also, White 2017.
75 The dependency argument is far stronger for the twentieth 
century (although even then local concerns were often more 
important than simplistic narratives allow). See Cardoso 
and Faletto (1979), and O’Donnell (1979).
order for capital; U.S. federal and state governments did 
not hesitate to violently repress striking workers, such 
as in the Homestead Steel and American Railway Union 
strikes. As Brands notes, “capital would protect its pre-
rogatives, by force if necessary” (2010, 519). The United 
States, Colombia, and Mexico were all experiencing an 
erosion of the power of democracy; as Rockman notes 
for the United States, “The logic and law of business 
spilled over from the realm of economic exchange to 
organize society and its politics…” (2014, 453).
John Markoff and Samuel Huntington track a num-
ber of “reverse waves” or “antidemocratic waves” 
that undid previous waves of democratization. For 
Huntington, the first of these reverse waves ran from 
1922-1942 (1991, 16). Markoff is much more sophisti-
cated, but while recognizing ebbs in democracy in the 
nineteenth century (mostly in Europe and the United 
States), his first great “antidemocratic wave” is also in 
the 1920s (1996, 1, 37-67, 76). I would like to propose that 
the late nineteenth century was another reverse wave 
of democratization, not only in Latin America, but the 
United States as well.
With further exploration, this late nineteenth-century 
“reverse wave” of democracy may help illuminate the 
world historic relationship between capitalism (as Latin 
America entered into a period of export-oriented capi-
talist growth) and democracy (in a nineteenth century in 
which most of the world’s democratic republics were in 
Latin America). However, until the democratic cultures 
of nineteenth-century Spanish America are recognized 
by those interested in the history of capitalism, this 
exploration will not happen. Given that many explana-
tions for the success or failure of democracies rely on 
ideas of democratic culture or legacies, ignoring Span-
ish America’s own rich democratic tradition seems fatal 
to these supposed explanations.76 My own brief conclu-
sion is clear: this study refutes those who insist that 
the relationship between democracy and capitalism is 
always positive and reinforces theorists who stress the 
contradictions between capitalism and democracy. At 
least in late nineteenth-century Mexico and Colombia, 
striving for capitalism worked to actively undermine, 
erode, and even erase a democratic political culture.77 
Capitalists, politicians, and letrados thought democracy 
caused too much disorder and gave popular groups too 
much influence over the state; the needs of capital, not 
of voters and popular soldiers, should be paramount.
76 This includes sophisticated and nuanced models, such as 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992, 274-275); and 
those less so, such as Ferguson (2011).
77 I should emphasize than I am not concluding this was always 
the case in the twentieth century or the present; however, 
the nineteenth-century case is clear.
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